Evaluate the capacity of any Central Asian state to respond to national security crisis?

Central Asia is a geopolitically and strategically important region for its vast energy resources, transportation routes and most of all location. The permanent struggle for domination between Russia and China, and the recent involvement of the region into the logistical activities of coalition forces in Afghanistan, present a unique opportunity for the region to develop its own security approach, model and structures.
However there always exist the internal threats as well as international. As in the case of Uzbekistan, the country now faces a possible change of leadership after President Karimov retires, then there are radical religious groups inside the country, such as Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IDU), there is constant illicit drug trafficking pouring from neighbouring Afghanistan and illicit migration, unrest in Ferghana valley, as well as certain instabilities on the borders. The country itself is considered to be as pariah by international community, has long history of abuse of the  human rights, and very unstable foreign policy.
What kind of national security crisis might happen in Uzbekistan? The question has to be considered taking into account the context of its current development and many other socio-economic and political aspects. The utmost domestic challenge Uzbekistan faces in the near future, as many analysts predict, is a change of power structure and its leadership. Karimov has yet to appoint his own successor and few know when and how it will take place. Uzbek analysts themselves can hardly answer the question. However few facts are known, such as measures taken by Karimov to prevent the young people from other places to come to study to Tashkent universities. Some defence analysts note that Uzbekistan started to actively  purchase new military equipment and hardware both from Near and Far abroad. Others remind that Uzbek border forces has become active and increased in numbers.
One should keep in mind that Uzbekistan is the most populated country in Central Asia (25 million) and thus has biggest arm, its defence budget exceeds 3% of GDP, the biggest contribution in CA. On top of it Uzbekistan is known as having border troubles with its neighbour Kazakhstan where few incidents were reported throughout the years. Uzbeks have major ethnic diasporas in Kyrgyzstan and Afghanistan where it already led to some disorders, as in June 2010 during Kyrgyz revolution. In Afghanistan, ISAF is in the process of creating national police and army involving large numbers of Uzbeks. And one the last but not least factors to be considered is that country had already been attacked by Islamic terrorist groups few times in the past. However, today, Uzbekistan serves as one of the biggest allies for coalition forces due to the upcoming drawdown in Afghanistan and allowed its territory to be used for logistical purposes. According to the high military command of the US, they place Uzbekistan as high priority country to cooperate with in the near future, that is while drawdown would not be completed.
All these factors present certain difficulties for leadership to cope with, and there can be ambiguous reactions.
Uzbekistan's foreign policy is twisted, by trying to manoeuvre between Russia and the West. Today, Uzbekistan is member of both SCO and CSTO, both of which include Russia, Kazakhstan. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Uzbeks have been in and out of CSTO since its creation, which was also reflected in what direction they put their priorities. Sufficient to say that Uzbekistan has never taken part in any exercises of both SCO and CSTO, which extremely puzzles other members. The country has been receiving Western defence assistance both bilaterally (US, UK) and through NATO, but it stopped after Andijan events in 2005 and now the country cannot receive direct military assistance from the West, there are also sanctions on buying lethal equipment. In other words, the West isolated Uzbekistan severely and now due to Afghanistan withdrawal it is back on stage.
Coming back to the change of leadership, the question stands as to how Uzbekistan will respond if something similar to Arab spring events would take place there? As was clearly demonstrated by Andijan, Uzbek domestic forces have enough capacity to suppress any sort of mass protests and riots. But what if the revolution would spread to the rest of the country? It is still possible that by acting rapidly and smartly, Uzbek interior and special forces might intervene, bearing in mind strong dictatorship policy and wide network of domestic intelligence. But, this rapid reaction will activate only and if President Karimov will still remain in power. If not, the whole force structure might collapse as it is centred around him. Uzbeks do still have Soviet mentality and once Karimov will be gone forcefully, no one can predict how military would work afterwards.
If revolution takes place throughout the entire country, there are mechanisms to address either CSTO and SCO, as well as Western allies. But who would come to help? From the experience Uzbeks know that neither SCO and CSTO cannot act in the cases of national security crises as was shown in June 2010 in Kyrgyzstan. The West will prefer to wait and see how events unfold: there is always opportunity to struck a new deal with a new leader once he is there and it maybe even be more preferred option. The West cannot cope with any Central Asian revolution as they are simply not interested and they have no capacity whatsoever to overthrow “CA Kaddafi”.
Another option to consider is bilateral assistance either or both from Russia and Kazakhstan, but again there are plenty of “ifs” involved. It will depend on what kind of state the current Russo-Uzbek, Kazakh-Uzbek relations are and certain other factors. It will depend whether Russia and Kazakhstan will be interested to help at all, bearing in mind constant swinging policy of Karimov. It will depend whether both countries will have enough capacity and willpower to do anything for Uzbekistan.
There is always China as powerful neighbour to take into account, however analysts insist that China is not interested in petty affairs of it small neighbours and will not lift a finger to change anything. Chinese diplomacy as its military power is tranquil and slow and Uzbekistan does not present enough interest for China to publicly announce its priorities. There are other f actors to consider.
In conclusion, Uzbekistan does have a certain capacities to cope with national security crisis but up to a point. If the situation with the change of power evolves and escalates, the external assistance/intervention might be needed. However, it is yet unclear as to whom Uzbeks would address, considering their unstable foreign policy and priorities and constant change of allegiance. Perhaps, after all, all interested parties will welcome a new leadership with whom they can make new arrangements and deals. But one should never forget about Uzbek mentality and Soviet legacy merged together.

(Written as sample essay, May 2012, Almaty, KazNU)